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It is often assumed that rationality and consciousness share some sort of essential connection.  Thus some theorists build rationality into their accounts of consciousness.  Ned Block, for example, famously claims that a mental state exhibits what he calls access consciousness if it “is poised for free use in reasoning and for direct “rational” control of action and speech” (2007, p. 168).​[1]​  In his (2011) paper “There It Is” and his (2012, this volume) précis “It’s Still There!” Benj Hellie develops a complex account of how perceptions justify beliefs--an account which effectively builds consciousness into rationality.  As Hellie puts it, he “advances a picture of the nature of rationality and rational explanation in which consciousness plays a central role” (2011, p.110).  

Hellie develops his account of perceptual justification against the backdrop of the view known as direct realism.  Hellie notes that direct realism involves a cluster of commitments, but that a central feature is the recognition of the distinction between so-called good cases wherein perception is accurate and bad cases such as hallucinations.  And Hellie develops a sophisticated semantics for perceptual justification according to which perceptions in good cases can justify beliefs and can be explained by intentional psychology.  In bad cases of perception, by contrast, Hellie argues that one’s perceptions are in an important way defective and so rational explanations do not apply in those cases.  Adapting John McDowell’s (1994) well-known expression, Hellie claims that in bad cases “we cannot offer a theory of justification; we must content ourselves with exculpation” (2011, p. 111).  

Though there is much to say about Hellie’s rich and challenging papers, I’ll focus this commentary on Hellie’s view of the relationship between perceptual justification and consciousness.  It is undoubtedly true that some conscious perceptions justify beliefs:  If I consciously perceive that there is a red apple, my conscious perception justifies my belief that there is a red apple.  However, there is increasingly good evidence that perceptions can occur outside of consciousness, as in cases of so-called subliminal perception in normal individuals and blindsight in people with damage to visual cortex.  I’ll argue that such perceptions can justify beliefs and rationalize behavior, even though these states are not within consciousness.  I will reserve judgment regarding Hellie’s treatment of the difference between good and bad cases, but I’ll argue there can be what he views as good cases of perceptual justification outside of consciousness.​[2]​

2.  Perceptual Justification Outside of Consciousness

At the outset of “There It is,” Hellie glosses the notions of rationality and justification in the following way: 
 
[T]he core notion of rationality is something like manifest coherence of the stream of consciousness.  If so, the most basic interpretation of the claim that A justifies B means something close to: from the first-person perspective, B was required to maintain coherence of the stream of consciousness in light of A (2011, p. 111).  

Though Hellie does not explicitly mention consciousness in his précis, he does commit to what he calls thesis (III):  “If two subjects are in distinct rational positions, what it is like for them differs” (2012, p. xxx).  Assuming, as most do, that there is something that it is like for one only if one is in a conscious state, it would seem to follow that one’s position cannot be rational in virtue of a nonconscious state.  Hence Hellie’s thesis effectively holds that perceptual justification cannot occur outside of consciousness.

I’ll begin by offering a theoretical reason to be open to the possibility that perceptual justification does not require consciousness.  Hellie may be correct that rationality involves maintaining a certain kind of coherence, but it need not be the coherence of one’s stream of consciousness.  The first thing to note is that, even if all perceptions and beliefs do occur within the stream of consciousness, the property of being within consciousness is distinct from the property of having a particular content.  Many states that exhibit distinct contents can all occur within consciousness.  Furthermore, if a perception justifies a belief, whatever rational connection holds between those states holds in virtue of their respective contents.  If I perceive that there is an apple, then I am justified in forming the belief that there is an apple--and that justificatory relationship holds because those states exhibit relevant contents involving the apple.  Thus the fact that some states occur within consciousness is independent of whether their relationships are rational (cf. Rosenthal 2008, p. 832).  

As a result, the core notion of rationality is better glossed as coherence within one’s stream of psychological states, whether or not those states occur within consciousness.  On this revised view of justification, if A justifies B, B was required to maintain coherence of the stream of psychological states--conscious or otherwise--in light of A. 

Hellie himself does not say much in his papers about the nature of psychological states, consciousness, or their relationship to one another, but he does briefly characterize the stream of consciousness as “the sequence of experiences (understood as token occurrences) one undergoes” (2011, p. 115).  The term ‘experience’ is often taken to imply a state that is within consciousness and many do make the Cartesian assumption that all psychological states occur consciously.  But Hellie offers no reasons to think this, and there is substantial evidence that psychological states such as perceptions and beliefs can, and often do, occur outside of consciousness.  Nowadays it is commonplace to talk about nonconscious intentional states such as beliefs and desires that guide or influence behavior.  There are many ordinary cases of, for instance, knowing what others believe or desire before those people know themselves.  

There is also evidence that qualitative states such as perceptions can occur outside of consciousness.  Consider, for example, the remarkable experimental work with the blindsight patient TN.  TN suffered bilateral damage to visual cortex.  As a result, under typical conditions reports TN that he cannot see anything and generally behaves as though he cannot.  But experimenters recently found that TN was nonetheless able to navigate successfully a corridor which included many barriers (de Gelder et al 2008).  

Arguably, what happened in TN’s case is that, during his walk down the corridor, TN nonconsciously perceived the barriers, which justified him in forming beliefs that there were obstructions in his environment.  Additionally, because of his goal to walk down the corridor, these newly formed beliefs interacted rationally with states (such as the belief that one cannot walk through barriers) to produce the rational behavior of moving skillfully around the barriers.  In other words, on the basis of TN’s nonconscious perceptions, certain beliefs about his environment were required in order to maintain coherence--not in his stream of consciousness, but in the stream of his psychological states generally.  

TN’s case is certainly striking and doubtless calls for explanation.  One might worry, however, that blindsight is a special phenomenon.  After all, TN suffered brain damage and we lack an exhaustive understanding of these kinds of conditions.  To the extent that Hellie is attempting to provide an account of perceptual justification in normal individuals, perhaps he is warranted in withholding judgment regarding such cases.

But there are many everyday instances of perceptual justification outside of consciousness in normal individuals as well.  For example, it is often the case that while you are in a crowded place engrossed in a book, at some point you may happen to look up to immediately lock eyes with someone who has been staring at you for a period of time.  A sensible explanation is that, though you were not at first aware that you saw the person stare at you, the fact that you subliminally saw the person justified you in believing there was such a person.  Because of your standing interest in investigating people that stare at you, the confluence of these states rationally caused you to look up directly at the person.    

	There are in addition experimental examples of similar phenomena.  In one study (Castiello, Paulignan, & Jeannerod 1991), participants were asked to grasp one of three targets as fast as possible when one of the targets was illuminated.  In some trials, as soon as participants began reaching for one target, the light was switched to another target.  Despite the changes in the targets, participants grasped for the illuminated targets in fluid and uninterrupted ways.  Participants were also asked to report if and when they noticed that the targets changed.  Remarkably, participants typically reported noticing that they needed to change their movement around 300 milliseconds after they had corrected their behaviors and began grasping for the illuminated target.  It is thus arguable that at first the participants subliminally perceived the changes.  

Again, though the participants were for sometime unaware that they had perceived the changes, given their prior goals of reaching for the illuminated targets, these subliminal perceptions rationally caused them to alter the trajectory of their reaches.  So even though these perceptions lay outside of consciousness, the behavioral adjustments that they caused were arguably rational.  Indeed, correcting one’s behavior in light of new incoming perceptual information to achieve one’s goals is the paradigm of rational activity. 

Importantly, these nonconscious perceptions do not seem to be bad cases of the sort that Hellie discusses in his papers.  To navigate the corridor successfully, for example, TN’s states had to register information about his environment accurately.  Put another way, TN did not hallucinate a barrier, consciously or otherwise.  Hellie may be right that rationalizing explanations only apply in good cases, but at first blush it appears there is no good reason to deny that some nonconscious perceptions are good cases that can justify beliefs and rationalize behavior.  

3.  Potential Replies

There are several reasons, however, why Hellie might deny that these are genuine cases of perceptual justification outside of consciousness.  As noted above, Hellie is committed to thesis (III), which holds that if two subjects are in distinct rational positions, what it is like for them differs.  Hellie notes in his précis that he defends (III) in “There It Is” “on the grounds that it accounts for the significance of ‘simulation’ (Heal 2003): that it explains the inextricable role of the ‘second-person perspective’ in real-life rationalization of the reactions of the other” (2012, p. xxx).  In other words, Hellie argues that, in order to determine whether someone else’s activity is rational, one must “‘push into’, ‘take up’, ‘project [oneself] into’, or ‘simulate’ [her] point of view, and rehearse the narrative she advanced to herself” (2011, p. 121).  Hellie’s account of what it is to take up another’s perspective in this way is complex, but, roughly, a narrative is a set of sentences that characterize the states of one’s consciousness and one rehearses a narrative by simulating that narrative to determine whether it is coherent.

Thus Hellie might argue that one cannot find, for example, TN’s activity rational because one is unable to adopt his point of view to find his narrative coherent or not.  Since the states of TN that register information about his environment are not conscious, there is nothing that it is like for TN to be in them.  One might thus think TN does not have a point of view with regard to those states.  If thesis (III) were true, it would seem TN cannot be in a rational situation in virtue of his nonconscious states.  

But since rational connections hold in respect of content and not consciousness, as I’ve argued, we ought not to characterize a narrative in terms of consciousness.  Instead, a narrative is better understood as the set of states of one’s psychology, whether or not those states are conscious.  And though one might assume that one only has a point of view with regard to one’s conscious states, this is arguably unsupported.  In order to navigate the corridor successfully, TN’s nonconscious perceptions must represent his environment egocentrically and are thus from his point of view--he is simply unaware of the states that are from that point of view.  

If so, then it is arguable that one can evaluate TN’s narrative.  Though we cannot imagine what it is like to be in TN’s perceptual states--for there is nothing that it is like to be in them--we can reflect on the narrative of TN’s psychological states characterized in terms of their content.  On that basis, we do not regard TN’s behavior as irrational, even though many of the contents involved in issuing in that behavior are nonconscious.  Hellie’s argument therefore fails to establish that perceptual justification requires consciousness.

During an exchange at the Third Annual Online Consciousness Conference, Hellie considers several other sorts of replies to these kinds of cases.  Hellie proposes that, whatever the states outside of consciousness that register information about one’s environment might be, it may be that they are not properly called ‘subliminal perceptions’ because they are not genuine psychological states.  On this view, nonconscious states are, to use Daniel Dennett’s (1969) term, subpersonal--that is, not personal-level psychological states such as beliefs, desires, and perceptions.  These states may be able to be explained in terms of biology or physics, or perhaps by some sort of nonmental computational explanation, but they are not within the purview of intentional psychology.  These states would thus be akin to bad cases insofar as they cannot enter into rationalizing explanations.  

This reply mirrors Hellie’s discussion of having one’s attention captured, which he claims is an example of what he calls “arational update in the stream of consciousness” (2011, p. 131).  Hellie avers that the processes that underlie one’s shifts of attention cannot be explained in terms of rationality.  Likewise, Hellie suggests that, in cases such as looking directly up at someone who has been staring at you, whatever nonconscious processes give rise to one’s behavior are not rationally explicable.  This seems to be a commonly held position.  For example, in discussing his characterization of access consciousness, Block hastens to add that “[t]he “rational” is meant to rule out the kind of control that obtains in blindsight” (2007, p. 168). 

But this reply is unconvincing.  These sorts of nonconscious states play the same functional roles as their conscious counterparts--they are simply not within one’s stream of consciousness.  TN’s states enable him to respond differentially to a range of stimuli during his walk down the corridor.  And, to repeat, these nonconscious states interact with psychological states such as beliefs and desires in ways that are rational.  Had TN previously believed that there were no barriers in the corridor, his registering visual information about them would doubtless have resulted in a conflict of some sort.  TN might not have immediately reported a feeling of confusion, but there is good reason to suppose that there would have been evidence of such a conflict such as delays in his ability to act on that information.  For these reasons, it is natural to describe these kinds of nonconscious states with the same intentional and qualitative vocabulary that we use to characterize conscious states.  

Hellie does not offer any reasons to think that nonconscious states are not psychological in his papers, but there are several reasons why one might find this claim inviting.  First, many assume that the paradigms of psychological states are those that occur within consciousness.  This may appear to be the case because the only states of which we seem to be directly aware are conscious states.  TN is certainly not aware that he sees any barriers and would deny that he does.  If we are in states that are not in consciousness, we only know about them in ways that seem indirect--such as by being told that we are in them or through conscious inference.  This may seem to suggest that nonconscious states are no more psychological and thereby open to rational explanation than the states of one’s stomach.  

Similarly, without sufficient prompting, TN would not verbally cite his states as justifications for why he behaved as he did, which might suggest that these states cannot function as the reasons for his actions.  Thus Block writes that “although the information that there is an X affects [a person with blindsight’s] “guess”, it is not available as a premise in reasoning… or for rational control of action or speech” (2007, p. 172).  If by ‘available’ Block means capable of being verbally cited as a reason, Block holds--and Hellie may agree--that the capacity to verbally cite one’s justifications for action is essential to rationality.  

But even if one is not aware of being in a state, it does not entail that the state is not a genuine psychological state such as a perception or a belief.  Though TN is not aware that he sees any barriers, this alone does not show that he does not see any barriers.  The only reason to hold that one is always aware of one’s psychological states is the dubious Cartesian assumption that the mind is always and fully known to itself.  Likewise, the fact that TN cannot verbally cite his perceptions as the reasons for his behavior does not show he does not have those reasons.  Serving as a premise in reasoning and rationally guiding behavior is distinct from being available to be reported as a reason for one’s behavior.  It therefore seems that we are often not aware of the reasons for our actions--and stipulating that one must be aware of one’s reasons begs the question against the possibility of nonconscious perceptual justification. 

Perhaps more fundamental to Hellie’s project is that it is a central tenet of direct realism that the only states that can enter into rationalizing explanations are those which put us into direct contact with the world.  Hellie unpacks the way in which perception is direct in part in terms of the so-called transparency of experience.  As Hellie observes, direct realism is committed to the idea that “ordinary perception is ‘transparent’ in at least the sense that we find no sense-data there to which to turn attention (Harman 1990)” (2012, p. xxx).  Direct realism denies that people perceive external objects indirectly by, for example, perceiving mental intermediaries such as a sense data and, on that basis, inferring that those external things exist.  But since we are never aware of being in nonconscious states in ways that do not seem indirect, one might think that those states cannot put us into the kind of direct contact with the world that the direct realist emphasizes.  

It is hard to see, however, how the fact that we are not aware of being in nonconscious states could make a difference as to whether they put us in direct contact with the world.  No version of indirect realism is entailed by the idea that some perceptions occur outside of consciousness.  TN may be directly aware of barriers, even if he is not conscious of his direct awareness of them.  

Crucially, insofar as direct realism is committed to a distinction between good and bad cases, there is evidence not only that accurate perceptions can occur outside of consciousness, but also that illusions can too.  For example, there is a visual phenomenon known as the simultaneous brightness-contrast illusion, wherein a gray object on a dark background is typically illusorily perceived to be brighter than the same gray object on a lighter background.  Recently, Marjan Persuh and Tony Ro (2012) used a technique known as metacontrast masking to determine whether this perceptual illusion can take place outside of consciousness.  

In a typical metacontrast-masking study, participants are briefly presented with a stimulus, which is immediately followed by a non-overlapping mask that renders the stimulus invisible to consciousness (see, e.g., Breitmeyer & Öğmen (​http:​/​​/​www.aliogmen.com​/​​) 2000).  Though participants report not seeing the stimuli, they can be primed by them in various ways that can be behaviorally detected, which suggests that they subliminally perceive such stimuli.  In their study, Persuh and Ro found that gray stimuli on dark backgrounds primed as though they were perceived to be brighter than the same stimulus on a lighter background, even when those stimuli were masked.  That is to say, this perceptual illusion can occur even if that perception occurs outside of consciousness.  

So one can endorse the direct realist’s distinction between good and bad cases, even if one denies that perceptual justification requires consciousness.  The question of whether rationality takes place only in good but not in bad cases is independent of the question of whether some perception takes place outside of consciousness.  If Hellie is correct about when rationalizing explanations apply, then perhaps no rational explanations can be given of these nonconscious illusions.  

In sum, there are no good reasons to deny that nonconscious states are genuinely psychological and that they can, at least sometimes, justify beliefs.  

In light of these considerations, Hellie instead might endorse the possibility that the states that register information about TN’s environment may be in his stream of consciousness.  On this view, TN consciously perceives the barriers, even though he cannot report that he perceives them.  If TN has any other conscious states, such as a conscious desire to walk down the hall, these other states may simply be encoded in TN’s consciousness differently than his conscious perceptions.  Thus TN’s walking down the corridor is wholly rationally explicable, even though TN may not be able to verbalize some of the rational activity that generates his behavior.  










Block, N. (2007), “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” in 
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1, MIT Press, pp. 159-213; originally published as N. Block (1995), The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18 (2): 227-247.
Breitmeyer, B. G. & H. Öğmen (​http:​/​​/​www.aliogmen.com​/​​) (2000), “Recent Models and Findings in Visual Backward 
Masking: A Comparison, Review, and Update,” Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 62 (8): 1572-1595.
Castiello, U., Paulignan, Y., & M. Jennerod (1991), “Temporal Dissociation of Motor 
Responses and Subjective Awareness: A Study in Normal Subjects,” Brain, 114 (6): 2639-2655. 
De Brigard, F. & J. Prinz (2010), “Attention and Consciousness,” Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews, 1 (1): 51-59.
de Gelder, B., M. Tamietto, G. van Boxtel, R. Goebel, A. Sahraie, J. van den Stock, B. 
M. C. Stienen, L. Weiskrantz, & A. Pegna (2008), “Intact Navigation Skills after Bilateral Loss of Striate Cortex,” Current Biology, 18 (24): R1128-R1129.
Dennett, D. C. (1969), Content and Consciousness, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Harman, G. (1990), “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” Philosophical Perspectives, 4:  
31-52.
Heal, J. (2003), Mind, Reason, and Imagination, Cambridge University Press.
Hellie, B. (2011), “There It Is,” Philosophical Issues, 21: 110-164.
Hellie, B. (2012), “It’s Still There!” this volume.
Koch, C. & N. Tsuchiya (2007), “Attention and Consciousness: Two 
Distinct Brain Processes,” Trends in Cognitive Science, 11 (1): 16-22. 
McDowell, J. (1994), Mind and World, Harvard University Press.
Persuh, M. & T. Ro (2012), “Context-Dependent Brightness Priming Occurs without 
Visual Awareness,” Consciousness and Cognition, 21 (1): 177-185.
Rosenthal, D. M. (2008), “Consciousness and Its Function,” Neuropsychologia, 46: 
829-840.
van Boxtel, J. J. A., N. Tsuchiya & C. Koch (2010), “Consciousness and Attention:  On 





^1	  All references to Block are from his paper “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” originally published in (1995) and reprinted in his (2007) collection.  Page references to Block are from the (2007) version.  
^2	  To be more precise, Hellie restricts good cases of perceptual states only to “what one is ‘attending to’” and he claims that anything else “has no direct presence within one’s stream of consciousness and therefore cannot be rationally significant” (2011, p. 131).  But Hellie offers no reason to hold this position in his papers, and it is not clear why one would hold it.  Even if Hellie were right that rationality requires consciousness (a view which I’ll challenge), whether consciousness requires attention is a vexed issue because of the considerable debate about how to understand attention.  At first blush, however, it seems clear that there are many conscious perceptions that do not involve attention, such as those involved in the periphery of one’s consciousness.  Such states may be less rich informationally than states that do involve attention, but it is not as though these peripheral perceptions need be illusory and hence bad cases.  There thus seems to be no reason to deny that a conscious perception without attention can justify a belief.  Additionally, there is mounting evidence that we can attend to stimuli in the absence of consciousness (see, e.g., Koch & Tsuchiya 2007, van Boxtel et al 2010).  For brevity’s sake, I will not review this evidence here and I acknowledge that some dispute it (e.g., de Brigard & Prinz 2010).  But if attention can occur nonconsciously, even if Hellie were right that rationality requires attention (which is doubtful), it would not provide a reason to deny that rationality can occur outside of consciousness.
^3	  I thank Myrto Mylopoulos, David Pereplyotchik, and Marjan Persuh for help with this commentary.  I also thank David Rosenthal for thoughtful comments on the online version of this commentary that I presented at the Third Annual Consciousness Online Conference.  I especially thank Benj Hellie for his detailed replies to that online commentary and Richard Brown for organizing the conference as well as this volume.  
